In 1981 I began a study to plan for the next stage of the fishery. At this stage both annual catches and average catch rates were still rising in nearly every area but I was convinced that we had long passed the time when limited entry might adequately control effort. Being largely dependent on the catch and effort data I discussed the virtue of trying a surplus production type assessment of the fishery with experts at CSIRO. Although this form of modelling has known deficiencies we decided that it was quite acceptable as a first approximation and as an educational aid to convincing the industry of the need to change. In addition Dr Julian Amos was the Minister and for the first time policy advice needed to presented in a more academic form. Some numerical analysis would be needed to convince this Minister to take decisive action.

My analysis suggested that the maximum sustainable yield for the fishery was 3,500 tonnes. Looking at each region revealed that the maximum sustainable yield for the west coast was 1,700 tonnes, the south 1,040 tonnes and the east 780 tonnes. Catches exceeded these levels on the east coast in 1978, 1980 and 1981; on the south coast in 1979 and 1981; and on the west coast in 1981. The conclusion was clear — catches had to fall. I estimated that the average diver made a surplus of $57,000 in 1981-2, so a modest cut was affordable. However it was one thing to know that catches had to fall, it was quite another to find a method.

The industry was in the midst of a marketing crisis and the Tasmanian Abalone Divers Association advised the Minister that if prices did not recover its members would have to ‘increase their effort in order to retain the same net return.’ Only individual transferable quotas offered any hope of reining in the catch, but would the industry accept it? The divers had not liked the restrictions imposed by processors that allowed them 24 tonnes each for 1982-3 and my calculations suggested they should be permanently kept below 28 tonnes. Although about 20 divers caught less than 15 tonnes in 1981-2, ten caught more than 50 tonnes. More than 50 divers would need to take substantial cuts if my proposal was approved.

A number of divers opposed the TADA view and wanted the quotas to continue, this seemed a good time to push for a cap on the catch applied through individual quotas. After a lot of discussion with a group of senior divers who had participated in the study, and the approval of the Minister, I was ready to start the formal consultation in early 1983. At a meeting of the Liaison Committee in April I made a little progress and got agreement to conduct a poll of the divers. The Minister had narrowed the scope by firmly rejecting the claims of some well known figures on the fringe of the fishery that the number of divers should be increased if catches were capped. Nevertheless, while most divers were in favour of some form of quota providing it had not significant impact on their overall catch, only 18 were in favour of quotas enforced by Government. Most were in favour of a weekend closure.

I presented a detailed case to the industry and organised a seminar for 20 May. The conference room in the TFDA building was full to overflowing as virtually all divers and processors gathered to discuss the proposal. I was not surprised that a variety of alternatives that would avoid capping individual catches were vigorously proposed but in Tony Wurf, the President of the Divers Association, I had a powerful ally. Wurf was a fine leader who cared deeply about the future of the fishery and fully understood the options. Another powerful factor in favour of ITQs was experience of the processors quota scheme. It showed that individual quotas could be monitored and had been successful in meeting the overall objective. Nevertheless we were seeking the biggest change in the long history of fisheries management in Tasmania. Although the theory of output controls had been argued for some years, no significant wild fishery had yet gone down this track.

Wurf and I were very pleased with the seminar. It gave us a green light and resolved that the Abalone Liaison Committee should further investigate the scheme. I prepared a paper that examined the capacity of increasing the minimum size and using closed seasons to safeguard the future of the stock. I also examined the suggestion that weekend fishing should be banned. In addition to that paper every one in the industry received a questionnaire seeking opinions on all aspects of quotas and the possible alternatives; I also asked whether the industry was ready for self-management. Without the support of the TADA the Minister deferred any decision and I was sent overseas to attend a major conference in Canada where I presented a review of abalone fisheries management and my stock assessment. I discussed the management of the fishery with experts in Canada, USA and in England.

Achieving enough support from the industry and Government to introduce quota management was made more difficult by the death of the Fisheries Development Authority. The Authority’s problems had begun about a year before. Following the election of the Liberal Government in 1982 the reticent and gentlemanly John Beswick assumed responsibility for Agriculture and Sea Fisheries, the former shadow minister Neil Robson, an avid trout fishermen, was appointed Minister for Inland Fisheries. Disagreement over the management of the scallop fishery in Bass Strait was a major problem for Beswick and the TFDA. A spectacular settlement of scallops around 1978 produced a major fishery overnight and drew capital from both traditional fishermen and non-fishermen in order to build larger vessels. Tasmanian scallop fishermen, located in D'Entrecasteaux Channel and along the east coast, used their rock lobster boats for a short season from May to August. The very large beds in Bass Strait could sustain full time scallop fishing as practised in Victoria and needed larger boats than the traditional rock lobster vessels. Therefore the traditional Tasmanian scallop fishermen tended to be isolated from the new beds by both their location and the limitations of their vessels, nevertheless they were able to exert considerable pressure on the Minister in determining policy. The new scallopers wanted the Victorian style policy - limited licences, full time fishing and no minimum size.

Perhaps of more importance was a consequence of the dubious financial practices including the infamous ‘bottom of the harbour schemes.’ Slick talking developers duped people with high tax obligations to invest in the new fishery. They were also able to engender enough support amongst those responsible for promoting Tasmanian economic development to creep through the rapidly closing door on new fishing boat licences. The Allied Fisheries affair unfairly cost the TFDA much credibility and led to Beswick’s replacement by Roger Groom. He had already decided to end the experiment with the semi-autonomous TFDA and return fisheries administration to a department that he could better control. The creation of the Sea Fisheries Department was the right move but the change resulted in the loss of the cream of our researchers.

I was not enthusiastic about the decision to transfer responsibility for fisheries inspection from the Department to Tasmania Police. The inspectors had for some time been unhappy with their pay and conditions and some saw the move as the only way to achieve wage justice. A few inspectors had formerly been police officers and saw little difference in returning but others had severe doubts. The culture of the former inspection service was significantly different from the police force and the inspectors knew that they would become fully integrated into Police and be required to undertake all the duties of a Police Officer. The advantage to Tasmania Police was to more easily justify the expenditure on their fleet of vessels. The former office of the inspectors on the ground floor of 23 Old Wharf became a Division of Tasmania Police under Bernie Morgan. In the light of subsequent developments it is interesting to note that Morgan was then a Superintendent and officers of this rank continued to be appointed to the post. The senior detective, Aub Canning, followed Morgan.

Following my return from overseas in mid 1984 a consensus for the abalone quota management system began to emerge. Tony Wurf and I toured the State convincing the doubters. The essence of the scheme was to allocate 3,600 units of catch to existing licensees. Wurf was very effective in countering almost all the economic and financial questions. The Liaison Committee decided to go with the scheme and another general meeting was held where I told the industry that the Government did not intend to decide how the total allowable catch should be distributed amongst the 125 divers. When one considers the endless debates and litigation on distribution methods that followed the later decisions to use this form of management in other fisheries this meeting might have been long and difficult. I was very pleasantly surprised when Tony Wurf proposed an equal allocation and there was virtually no debate. The Association demonstrated its democratic credentials and the few heavy hitters decided not to argue. The five special licensees would initially get 20 tonnes each a year and the rest 28 tonnes.

There was more debate on the subject of minimum and maximum holdings after transfers began. Eventually it was agreed that every diver would need to keep 16 units and no one could accumulate more than 80. The licence fee was to be charged on a per unit basis. Still all was not yet resolved for the Processors rebelled: boycotting and then resigning from the Liaison Committee and organising political opposition. However the Minister stood firm but for a last minute concession where he gave the industry an additional 10% on the catch for the first year so for 1985 the 3600 units would be worth 1.1 tonnes. The value of the unit would be determined each year by the Liaison Committee based on scientific advice; but for 1986 it would be 1 tonne.

The scheme was introduced for the beginning of 1985 and widely praised by divers. ‘Success has many fathers’ and four years later the President of the Divers Association claimed exclusive ownership of the idea and that my assessment was only published in response to their ‘agitation’. In reality all the research in the first 20 years of the fishery was only begun after detailed discussion with a group of experienced divers keen to found the fishery on a solid foundation. Tony Wurf was able to expand this group into a workable majority and the Association. Now that the divers had enhanced access rights they could more confidently adopt a conservative approach to harvesting. In the sixteen years that limited entry had been used to limit fishing pressure, annual fishing effort had increased from less than 30,000 diver hours to 67,000 hours. The annual catch had grown from 2,000 tonnes to 4,500 tonnes and the annual value of the fishery from less than $1 million to over $18 million.

When individual quotas were introduced the stocks had already yielded 55,000 tonnes of abalone — well over 100 million shellfish. At today’s values this represents $2.75billion and despite recent pressure still held the potential to maintain high catches and produce an annual income stream of $100million. (Between 1985 and 2000 another 40,000 tonnes was harvested.) Most of those who were drawn to Tasmania to dive for abalone have stayed here. A few like Robbie Louden moved to warmer climes and he now has a major fishing business in Cairns. Much of the wealth generated from the fishery has been invested in the Tasmanian economy — Tasmanian Seafoods, Nortas salmon, Freycinet Wines are but three examples. Greg Langley invested in oyster farming, Tony Wurth in a Strahan tourist resort and Geoff Harper is a major Hobart developer.

The capital value of rights to participate in the fishery is now $1billion. Most of rights are still held by former divers and, despite the high prices, a number of new divers look to buy quota.